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1. Introduction 
The growth of campaign spending over the past decade has attracted consider­
able attention. Recent studies have analyzed the impact of contributions on 
legislative vote patterns and the effects of campaign spending on election out­
comes,I This paper views political contributions as one form of voting and 
attempts to further our understanding of the determinants of individual deci­
sions to contribute to political candidates. 
Our information on individual political contributions is obtained from a new 
data set on individual income tax returns. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
and as early as 1971, the Internal Revenue Code allowed a dollar-for-dollar tax 
credit for contributions to political candidates and political groups. The ceiling 
on this credit was'$50 for single filers and $100 for married filers. The fact that 
the price of giving is effectively zero implies that an individual's choice to 
contribute and take the tax credit is a '~vote" in the political process.2 We 
examine the relations between these political contributions, or "votes," and 
wealth, age, income tax rates and other relevant variables. 
OUf examination of political contributions provides empirical input into 
the voting-model literature. While most previous research examines political 
contributions and votes at highly aggregated levels (e.g., municipal, con­
gressional, gubernatorial or presidential seats), our paper examines political 
contributions at the level of the individual. An advantage of examining indi­
viduals is that the study suggests which factors dominate an individual's 
decision to contribute and vote and therefore should be included in voting­
model examinations of the relation between contributions, votes and outcomes 
of elections. 
*The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Trea­
sury Department. 
2. Political contributions: Data sources and testing specification 
Prior to 1987, the U.S. individual income tax allowed a dollar-for-dollar tax 
credit for contributions up to $50 for single and $100 for joint filers. Since the 
price is effectively zero, the decision regarding usage of tax credits is similar 
to the decision regarding voting. In both cases, the costs are similar and involve 
mainly time and information costs. In the case of voting, one must learn of 
the upcoming election, be registered and go to the poll. In the case of tax 
credits, one must pick his candidate(s), fill in the appropriate form, mail the 
check and then claim the credit on a tax return. The benefits of political contri­
butions display characteristics similar to voting as well. The benefits to voting 
may be one's alignment with politicians of similar ideologies and with govern­
ment policies that protect or enhance voters' wealth. Because tax credits convey 
benefits similar to voting, taking advantage of tax credits should yield similar 
benefits. 
Our data on political credits are obtained from individual income tax re­
turns, Form 1040. The data allow us to determine whether or not an individual 
opted for the tax credit, and, hence, has contributed to political candidates. 
Unfortunately, we cannot determine characteristics of fund-recipients; i.e., 
party affiliation or level of office (municipal, congressional, etc.) or the actual 
size of contributions when they exceed the tax credit ceiling. These issues, 
however, should not pose problems to our empirical work since we are not 
concerned with modeling the effects of these contributions on elections out­
comes and political behavior. Rather, we are concerned with determining why 
taxpayers "vote" via contributions. 
While individual tax returns contain information on income sources and can 
be used in deriving marginal tax rates, they are lacking in data on demographics 
and wealth. Therefore, we resort to a new data source that combines income 
and estate tax returns. This data set is based on a sample of estate tax returns 
of decedents in 1982 filed during 1982 and 1983. These estate tax returns were 
matched against the income tax returns for 1981. The match was successful for 
6,212 tax returns. We eliminate divorced and separated inviduals in order to 
simplify our task of controlling for the influence of demography. This reduces 
the number of observations to 5,180 individuals with net worth ranging from 
$25,000 to well over half a billion.3 
We suggest the following testing specification of individual choice regarding 
political contributions:4 
PC = f(AGE, WEALTH, MARRIED, TAX RATE, REGION) (1) 
where, PC = 1 if political contribution are made; 0 otherwise 
Table 1. Logit regression results'" 
(Dependent variable = 1 if individual makes a contribution) 
CONSTANT 
In(AGE) 
[In(AGE)]2 
In(WEALTH) 
MARRIED 
TAX RATE 
DUMMY NORTHEAST 
DUMMY MIDWEST 
DUMMY WEST 
Log of likelihood 
Sample size 
Number with contributions 
-33.378 
(12.107) 
12.734 
( 5.765) 
-1.547 
( 0.686) 
0.254 
( 0.049) 
0.909 
( 0.074) 
3.293 
( 0.245) 
0.058 
( 0.091) 
0.187 
( 0.088) 
0.220 
( 0.090) 
-2872 
5810 
1341 
"'Standard errors in parentheses. 
AGE = age of individual 
WEALTH net worth 
MARRIED = 1 if individual is married; 0 otherwise 
TAX RATE = marginal tax rate 
REGION = regional dummies for the Northeast, Midwest, and West. 
To evaluate the effects of the above right-hand-side variables on the odds of 
contributing, we estimate a logit regression of (1). All of these variables are 
directly available on the tax returns with the exception of the marginal tax rate 
which is simulated. The simulation is performed by increasing the adjusted 
gross income by $100 and simulating the change in tax liability through the 
return. 
3. Empirical findings 
Table 1 exhibits the logit estimation of (1), with the odds of contributing as a 
function of AGE, WEALTH, MARRIED, TAX RATE, and regional dum­
mies. The results indicate that the odds of making political contributions rise 
with age and suggest that increases in political awareness are greatest in the 
early years of the life cycle. This suggests that the older the individual is, the 
greater is his interest in the system and, therefore, is more likely to contribute 
to political candidates. The sign of the coefficient of the squared log of age, 
however, indicates that the odds of contributing rise with age but at a declining 
rate. 
The significant and positive coefficient for the log of WEALTH indicates 
that the odds of contributing rises with net worth. This suggests that wealth is 
an important determinant of an individual's interest in the political process. 
The odds of contributing also rise with TAX RATE. Individuals in high mar­
ginal tax brackets are more likely to contribute than those in lower tax brack­
ets. This result suggests that, given governmental income redistribution poli­
cies, individuals in high tax brackets face higher relative prices for government 
goods and, therefore, face greater incentives to participate in the political 
process via making political contributions. This result may also suggest that 
individuals not only vote at the polls with their "pocketbooks," but also con­
tribute to politicians accordingly. 
As for the dummy variables, MARRIED exerts positive effects on the odds 
of contributing. The signs on the coefficients of regional dummies suggest that 
individuals from the West and Midwest are more likely to contribute than 
individuals from the Northeast or the South. 
4. Conclusion 
Two implications from this research are noted. First, from a researcher's view­
point, our research suggests the importance of age, wealth, tax rates, and 
marital status as determinants of political contributions by top U.S. wealth­
holders. Therefore, these factors should be included in aggregated models that 
attempt to analyze the relations between such variables as voting, campaign 
expenditures and the outcomes of elections. Second, from politicians' view­
points, this research suggests that individual economic variables such as margi­
nal tax rates and wealth are major determinants of individual decisions to con­
tribute to politicians. Assuming that such contributions reflect "votes," this 
research suggests the relative importance of focusing campaign promises on 
economic variables - a strategy that "low tax" politicians like Ronald Reagan 
and George Bush may keenly be aware of. 
Notes 
1. See Jacobson (1984, 1985), Mablin (1984), Becker (1983), Chappell (1982), and Kau et al. 
(1982), Welch (1980, 1981), and Bental and Ben-Zion (1981). 
2. See Jacobson (1976) for a discussion of public funds for politicians. 
3. A list of the variables and summary statistics are available upon request. 
4.	 Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Stigler (1971) argue that voting is a function of individual 
benefit-cost calculations. Many factors are candidates for inclusion into these calculations. 
Kau and Rubin (1979) argue that ideology enters into the calculation since contributors may 
support candidates with the greatest advocacy of their views about government policy. Others 
suggest the importance of "closeness of the race" (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) and the costs 
of voter-information (Tollison, Crain and Paulter, 1975). 
References 
Becker, G.S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400. 
Bental, B. and Ben-Zion, U. (1981). A simple model of political contributions. Public Finance 
Quarterly 9: 143-157. 
Chappell, H.W. (1982). Campaign contributions and congressional voting: A simultaneous 
probit-tobit model. Review of Economics and Statistics 64: 77-83. 
Jacobson, G.C. (1976). Public funds for congressional candidates: Who would benefit? Public 
Policy 24: 1-32. 
Jacobson, G.C. (1984). Money in the 1980 and 1982 congressional elections. In M. Malbin (Ed.), 
Money and politics in the United States. Chattam, NJ: Chattam House. 
Jacobson, G.C. (1985). Money and votes reconsidered: Congressional elections, 1972-1982. Pub­
lic Choice 47: 7-62. 
Kau, J .B. and Rubin, P .H. (1979). Self-interest, ideology, and logrolling in congressional voting. 
Journal of Law and Economics 22: 365-384. 
Kau, J.B., Canon, D. and Rubin, P.H. (1982). A general equilibrium model of congressional 
voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 97: 271-293. 
Malbin, M.L (Ed.) (1984). Money and politics in the United States. Chattam, NJ: Chattam 
House. 
Riker, M.J. and Ordeshook, P .C. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. The American Politi­
cal Science Review 62: 25-42. 
Stigler, G.J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 2: 3-21. 
Tollison, R.D., Crain, W.M. and Pautter, P. (1975). Information and voting: An empirical note. 
Public Choice 24: 43-49. 
Welch, W.P. (1980). The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups. Public Choice 
35: 97-120. 
Welch, W.P. (1981). Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model. Public Choice 36: 209­
234. 
